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1. Introduction 
Following the Great Recession and recognizing the robustness of the US knowledge economy, 
which sustained high employment and wages amid broad economic weakness,1 in 2009 the 
U.S. government made a strategic decision to substantially increase federal funding for 
research and development (R&D) in high technology industries such as biotechnology (Hand, 
2009; Mervis, 2009).  In 2011 Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, publicly 
outlined the rationale and the influential role of government investments in R&D (Bernanke, 
2011).  Not surprisingly, interest in measuring the returns to public R&D investments quickly 
followed, not only in the U.S. (Basken, 2012) but also, in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and 
elsewhere (pg. 137 Stephan, 2012). These recent developments have revitalized a general 
interest towards the relationship between government funded R&D and economic growth.  
This relationship has been the focus of a long stream of research that has stressed the 
contribution of public R&D to increased innovation and productivity and has concluded that 
the social rate of return to public R&D investment is typically high  (e.g. Beise and Stahl, 
1999; Mansfield, 1991, 1995, 1997; Narin et al., 1997; Salter and Martin, 2001; Tijssen, 2002; 
Toole, 2012). Such findings have, in turn, supported continuing public R&D spending over 
time.   
The conceptual underpinnings of such work are also strong. Investments in R&D tend to be 
risky, mainly due to limited knowledge appropriability and uncertainty of outcomes (Arrow, 
1971).  Such characteristics can discourage private parties from investing in R&D because the 
expected private rate of return is low. In fact, the social rate of return from R&D investments 
                                                 
1 We subscribe to the definition of the knowledge economy in Powell and Snellman (2004): “production and 
services based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technological and 
scientific advance as well as equally rapid obsolescence”   
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often outweighs the private rate (Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996).  Consequently, governments 
may be able to correct this market failure by funding R&D and increase the odds of socially 
desirable outcomes (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959).2  
This sort of argument for government intervention relies heavily on a complete 
understanding and accounting of the benefits from public R&D funding.  Yet, one potential 
benefit from public R&D funding, firm creation, has received relatively limited attention in the 
academic literature despite the strong link between firm creation and economic growth (Van 
Praag and Versloot, 2007; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).  Indeed, there are good theoretical 
reasons to expect that public R&D funding may encourage firm creation.  For instance, 
increased R&D expenditures can expand the knowledge base developed in universities and 
other research institutions and a part of it can be commercially exploited through firm spinoffs 
(Chachamidou and Logothetidis, 2008; Lockett and Wright, 2005).3 New firms may also be 
formed to capitalize on non-appropriated knowledge (e.g. Acs et al., 2009; Audretsch and 
Keilbach, 2007). 
In this study we focus on the question of whether publicly funded R&D expenditures lead 
to firm births in knowledge-intensive industries and in particular in biotechnology. A number 
of studies have examined the relationship between R&D expenditures and firm births but most 
have not delineated the sources of funds that support R&D (Bade and Nerlinger, 2000; Goetz 
and Morgan, 1995; Karlsson and Nyström, 2011; Kim et al., 2011; Kirchhoff et al., 2007; 
Woodward et al., 2006). Accordingly, our knowledge on the impact of public R&D funding on 
firm creation is limited.   
                                                 
2 Salter and Martin (2001) and Chaminade and Edquist (2006) elaborate that additional considerations, besides the 
market failure arguments, are often in place before the government intervenes in the market place.  
3 Data from the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) suggest that over the last twenty years 
more than 9,000 university spinoff firms were created based on knowledge and intellectual property developed at 
major research universities in the US. 
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In our review of the literature we have identified only two studies that have focused on the 
impact of public R&D funding on the creation of biotechnology startups: Chen and Marchioni 
(2008) and Zucker et al. (1998).  Both studies find a positive relationship between indicators of 
publicly funded R&D activity and local biotechnology firm births. Our study adds to the 
findings of these two studies and introduces a number of methodological and measurement 
improvements.  For instance, these previous studies do not distinguish between the type of 
organization that receives the public funding and performs the R&D. Here, we recognize the 
potential for differential efficiencies between industrial and academic R&D organizations on 
the rate of firm creation (Bade and Nerlinger, 2000; Karlsson and Nyström, 2011) and examine 
the impacts of public R&D funds directed to universities, private firms, research institutes and 
research hospitals separately.  The two previous studies have also measured the impact of 
federal R&D outlays on firm creation in the biotechnology industry for rather short periods of 
time (up to two years). Here, we extend the period of analysis to 18 years (1992 to 2010) 
recognizing the inherent long cycles involved in R&D funding, knowledge development and 
potential firm creation from such new knowledge.  As well, instead of proxies of R&D 
intensity employed in the two previous studies (a life sciences index and a count of faculty 
members with grants) we use a more direct and sharper measure of R&D activity, namely, the 
dollar amount of R&D funding awarded to universities, private firms, research institutes and 
research hospitals.  
We focus on firm births in the biotechnology industry for several reasons. First and 
foremost, because the biotechnology industry is a core part of the knowledge economy and 
understanding how it grows is important. Second, because the industry is a heavy recipient of 
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federal research funds (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011), it is a fertile ground for our investigation.4 
Third, because of the close linkage between basic biotechnology research and commercial 
applications, there is potential for a strong relationship between the level of R&D activity and 
firm births (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; McMillan and Narin, 2000).  Fourth, because the 
biotechnology industry exhibits a strong tendency to cluster in narrow geographies (Audretsch 
and Stephan, 1996; Powell et al., 2002; Zucker et al., 1998), biotechnology firm births tend to 
concentrate in regions with large venture capital pools, specialized labor pools, and anchor 
institutions, like large biotechnology firms and universities (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; 
Powell et al., 1996; Powell et al., 2012; Zucker et al., 1998). These are exactly the types of 
institutions and geographies that a large share of public biotechnology R&D investment is 
typically directed to. For these and other reasons, we expect that if a relationship between 
public funding of R&D and firm creation exists, it should be possible to detect in the 
biotechnology industry. 
For our empirical analysis we construct a rich dataset that includes all R&D funds from the 
largest funding source, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), directed towards biotechnology 
research from 1992 up to 2010.  We complement this dataset with information about 
biotechnology firm births, venture capital investments and other relevant variables from 
Thomson’s Financial SDC Platinum Database and other sources.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows: In the next section we briefly discuss the 
biotechnology industry and some of its characteristics that make it attractive for our analysis. 
In sections 3 and 4 we review the relevant literature and develop our theoretical expectations 
on the effects of federal R&D monies on biotechnology firm births. In section 5 we describe 
                                                 
4 Biotechnology is not a heavy recipient of public R&D investments only in the US, but across the world (for 
instance see Dohse (2000). 
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our econometric model and estimation procedures, and in section 6 we review the data we use.  
In section 7 we present the estimation results and in section 8 we discuss how we test the 
robustness of those results.  Finally, in section 9 we offer concluding comments, implications 
for policy and suggestions for further research. 
2. The Biotechnology Industry 
The scientific origins of biotechnology can be traced back to the advancements of molecular 
biology and related fields in the 1950s (Kenney, 1986). However, biotechnology as an industry 
began to develop after the discovery of the basic technique for recombinant DNA in 1973 from 
Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of University of California – San 
Francisco.  
The fundamental discoveries in genetic engineering led to an ever-increasing rate of 
innovation. By the mid-1980s, a large number of novel products and processes were being 
pursued in a variety of industries (Mowery and Nelson, 1999). For instance, in the 
pharmaceutical industry regulatory proteins (e.g. human insulin and growth hormone), 
vaccines, antibiotics and monoclonal antibodies for diagnostic and therapeutic uses, were early 
targets. In agriculture, animal health products and growth promotants, and genetically 
engineered plants (e.g. plants resistant to herbicides, insects, diseases, and drought), were also 
broadly pursued. Improved amino acids, enzymes, vitamins, lipids, were the main targets in the 
specialty chemicals industry. And, R&D activities extended in various other industries, from 
food processing to environmental remediation.  
The development of waves of biotechnology innovations and associated competencies, 
such as genetic engineering, bioprocessing, genomics, proteomics, metabolomics and others, 
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has since continued and has led to an ever-expanding range of potential commercial 
applications and in the scope of the industry (Orsenigo et al., 2001).  In parallel, scores of 
scholarly works have documented the industry’s growth, its reliance on scientific talent and 
new knowledge development and transmission as well as its emergence at the core of the 
knowledge economy (e.g. Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Whittington 
et al., 2009; Zucker et al., 1998).   
Since its initial emergence, an important feature of biotechnology has been that new 
knowledge development in the lab has found immediate commercial applications in the market 
place. As such, biotechnology has continued to blur the distinction between basic and applied 
research. This feature, has led to its lasting success in attracting risk capital and in firm creation 
(Ernst&Young, 2012). It has also proved a good fit and a catalyst for the emergence of the 
entrepreneurial university (Renault, 2006). With regard to science, biotechnology has promoted 
interdisciplinary research, largely because it draws upon a number of diverse knowledge bases 
and housing all relevant knowledge under one roof is increasingly difficult (Pisano, 2006). 
Furthermore, it has promoted intense university-industry collaboration and commercialization 
of university research as well as firm creation.5  
In sum, the biotechnology industry is at the center of the knowledge economy, it is heavily 
supported through government R&D funds, and many of its features make it an important 
industry to analyze the relationship between public funding of R&D activities, knowledge 
development and firm creation. 
                                                 
5 It is not clear how many of the university spinoffs in the US are biotechnology firms as AUTM does not provide 
details about the industrial focus of these new firms. However, from the few universities that do provide such 
details as well as from survey results, biotechnology startups appear to constitute a large majority (Wobbekind et 
al., 2012; Zhang, 2009)  
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3. How Can Federal R&D Expenditures Lead to Firm Births? 
Except, perhaps, in exceptional cases, there are inherent measurement difficulties with 
establishing a direct causal relationship between specific government R&D funds, ensuing new 
knowledge outcomes and resulting firm births by tracing some sort of lineage. In this study, we 
instead ask the question whether an increase in the amount of public R&D investment in some 
location leads to a parallel and measurable increase in firm births within some distance from 
the location where the R&D activity takes place. In principle, there are, at least, two 
mechanisms that public R&D spending may lead to firm creation. First, government R&D 
expenditures can lead to firm births because they can expand the level of knowledge that can 
be pursued commercially by research organizations with voluntary firm spinoffs and other 
forms of ventures that have formal ties to these organizations (e.g. joint ventures, subsidiaries, 
etc.).6 Second, they can strengthen localization economies, which can attract and support the 
creation of new firms in a given region.  
  The first mechanism is straightforward. Federal funds can expand R&D outlays which, 
in turn, would tend to yield more knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). As Klevorick et al. 
(1995) demonstrate, public R&D expenditures can expand the scope of opportunities that can 
be pursued commercially. As such, voluntary spinoffs, which rely on the research and 
knowledge flows of research organizations, could materialize (Garvin, 1983; Ndonzuau et al., 
2002).  Indeed, in knowledge industries, such as biotechnology, voluntarily spinoffs from 
incumbent firms as well as from public research institutions are common (Chachamidou and 
Logothetidis, 2008; Lockett and Wright, 2005).  For example, the first ever biotechnology 
                                                 
6 Often, in the literature on the determinants of firm births there is a distinction between startups which are defined 
as new firms without a specific scientific origin, and between spinoffs/spinouts which refer to firms that spawn 
from particular institutions such as universities and private firms. In order to develop our theoretical expectations 
we consult with research that uses both terms.  
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firm, Genentech, was a spinoff from the University of California, San Francisco. Similarly, 
Intermune Pharmaceuticals was a spin out of Connetics Corporation and Guidant of Eli Lilly 
(Ledbetter and Zipkin, 2002).   
The second mechanism that can encourage firm births through the strengthening of 
localization economies is more indirect. Localization economies are typically defined as gains 
from the co-location of similar firms. They can be partitioned to gains in the knowledge base of 
firms (knowledge spillovers, network externalities and the like) and gains from efficiencies in 
the costs of doing business (access to a skilled labor pool and specialized suppliers, availability 
of firms in complementary industries) (Döring and Schnellenbach, 2006). An increase in the 
level of R&D expenditures in a particular location can lead to improvements in localization 
economies and, hence, in the odds of local firm creation.7  
More specifically, confronted with substantial research expenditures, long research 
cycles, scientific complexities and a strict regulatory environment (DiMasi and Grabowski, 
2007; Haussler and Zademach, 2007) firms in high technology industries often leverage the 
imperfect appropriability of knowledge (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959) and its inherent difficulty 
of transfer over physical space (Audretsch, 1998) by sourcing knowledge and know-how from 
nearby research-intensive institutions.  This happens via interpersonal interactions of economic 
actors working in similar problems, collaboration between nearby firms, participation in local 
professional networks and labor mobility of highly trained employees (Bathelt et al., 2004; 
                                                 
7 As we discuss in this section, a significant body of research demonstrates the existence and strength of 
knowledge spillovers between closely located actors. Nevertheless, other contributions, including Breschi and 
Lissoni (2001), have questioned the relevance of knowledge spillovers.  Similarly, physical proximity among 
actors may also increase the chances that one’s ideas can be appropriated by others (Shaver and Flyer, 2000) 
perhaps due to increased local competition. For an opposing view see Feldman and Kelley  (2006) and Audretsch 
and Stephan (1999).  
9 
 
Dahl and Pedersen, 2004; Kolympiris and Kalaitzandonakes, 2013; Liebeskind et al., 1996; 
Saxenian, 1991).   
As the knowledge base of research organizations increases with their R&D investment 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), the opportunity for knowledge acquisition by closely located 
firms should increase as well. Indeed, especially young firms located in proximity to research 
intensive institutions often achieve higher innovative outcomes potentially due to such 
knowledge acquisition effects (Acs et al., 1994; Anselin et al., 1997, 2000; Fischer and Varga, 
2003; Jaffe, 1989).  Accordingly, the potential for knowledge acquisition can provide strong 
incentives for newly founded firms to locate in proximity to sources of knowledge that can be 
exploited (Grossman and Helpman, 1992).  
A somewhat different form of localization economies that is almost unique to the 
biotechnology industry, has been described by a stream of research developed by Powell and 
his colleagues (e.g. Powell, 1996; Powell et al., 2002; Powell et al., 1996; Powell et al., 2012; 
Whittington et al., 2009). 8 As they explain, the diversity of local organizations (e.g. firms, 
universities etc.) in a region can boost the local biotechnology birth rate. When there is 
diversity in the local environment, communities can more easily overcome declines and 
increased competition can create different standards, practices, rules and strategies that are 
most relevant for success. This is particularly relevant for biotechnology perhaps because its 
broad knowledge base favors numerous competing experimentations before reaching the most 
desired outcome.  Among the diverse organizations, Powell and his colleagues highlighted the 
                                                 
8 These studies have also noted that networks across relevant actors are an important source of innovation in 
biotechnology. Such networks can potentially influence the startup rate of a region as long as new startups are 
attracted to them. To capture such ties we would need access to the formal and, potentially, informal linkages of 
the biotechnology firms, universities and research institutes in our dataset. Such information is not available to us. 
However, insofar as organizations that receive more funds tend to engage more heavily in networks, concerns of 
the impact of this data limitation on our work should be alleviated.  
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importance of a local anchor entity (e.g. large firm, research university, etc.) that “...becomes a 
scaffolding that, either intentionally or unexpectedly, assists subsequent connections..” (Powell 
et al., 2012).  In this context of the biotechnology industry, federal R&D funds are allocated to 
different types of research institutions and might increase the diversity of local research 
organizations. At the same time, the bulk of such funding goes to large research universities 
that may act as anchor organizations in various regions. As such, public R&D funding might 
increase firm births in the biotechnology industry through the location effects described by 
Powell and his colleagues. Indeed, there is significant evidence that most early biotechnology 
startups were founded around universities, where major breakthroughs took place (Audretsch 
and Stephan, 1996; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). 
Investments in R&D can augment knowledge spillovers among proximate firms but can 
also induce efficiencies in the costs of doing business of knowledge industries by enhancing 
specialized and localized labor pools and encouraging the presence of firms in complementary 
industries.  Specifically in biotechnology, service providers and other suppliers such as firms 
with expertise in biological materials and advanced laboratory equipment tend to locate in 
regions with high research intensity (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003a).  Insofar as newly founded 
biotechnology firms are attracted by the resource endowment of a given region (Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2003b) an increase in the availability of research dollars can boost the attractiveness 
of the region as a potential startup location.   
Along the same lines, an increase in R&D spending, especially through government 
grants to universities that train new scientists through research, can enhance the talent in the 
local labor pool and accordingly boost the local availability of highly-skilled labor (Pouder and 
St. John, 1996). Employee turnover from incumbent firms can also enhance the local labor 
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pool (Kim and Marschke, 2005). A region with ample highly-skilled labor could therefore 
attract and encourage the creation of new local firms.  
 Regions rich in knowledge base may also lead to firm births through a mechanism 
described under the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship (KSTE). Knowledge 
originally developed at incumbent organizations may be commercially pursued by alert 
individuals, often previous employees, who recognize the potential of these projects and 
mobilize local networks and other means towards the development of their firm (Acs et al., 
2009; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007).9 10   
4. Empirical Evidence on Federal R&D Expenditures and Firm Births  
Empirical evidence in the literature is generally consistent with the arguments in the previous 
section and suggests a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and firm creation. A 
stream of research has documented a consistent positive association between proxies of R&D 
intensity, such as the number of R&D employees in a region, and the rate of local firm births 
(Bade and Nerlinger, 2000; Goetz and Morgan, 1995; Karlsson and Nyström, 2011; Kim et al., 
2011; Kirchhoff et al., 2007; Woodward et al., 2006).11   
Importantly, several studies in this stream of research have sought to distinguish the 
relative impact of academic and industrial R&D on firm creation. These studies have found 
                                                 
9 Previous employers can guard against the use of knowledge acquired internally (Kim and Marschke, 2005), but 
significant evidence of firm spinoffs without formal ties with the parent company (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper 
and Sleeper, 2005) suggests that such protection schemes are often bypassed. 
10 Bhide (1994) provides indirect evidence towards such effects by reporting that 71 percent of firm founders in 
his sample stated that their business originating idea came either through replication or modification of an idea 
encountered through previous employment. 
11 Indirect evidence is also provided by studies that examine the relationship between the density of institutions 
that conduct R&D in a region and the rate of new firm births at that region as well as from studies that analyze the 
rate that academic institutions and private organizations spawn startups (e.g. Baptista and Mendonça, 2010; 
Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Steffensen and Rogers, 2000; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003a). 
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that who conducts the R&D matters to the rate of firm creation and there appears to be a 
stronger linkage between the creation of new firms with R&D activity occurring in firms rather 
than with R&D taking place in academic institutions (Bade and Nerlinger, 2000; Karlsson and 
Nyström, 2011).  What is difficult to infer from all these previous studies, however, is the 
impact of federally funded R&D on firm creation because they measure R&D activity without 
any reference to its funding source. 
 A handful of studies have examined directly the relationship between government R&D 
funding and firm creation and here the evidence is more limited and nuanced. Kim et al. (2011) 
examined the factors that influence the annual rate of firm births and deaths in the US (without 
any specific industry focus) and found that industrial R&D expenditures had a positive effect 
on firm births but government R&D investments had no distinguishable effect. Samila and 
Sorenson (2010) also studied the relationship between federally funded R&D grants to 
academic institutions and the annual rate of firm births in the US (again without a specific 
industry focus). Samila and Sorenson (2010) concluded that while in isolation federal R&D 
funding to academic institutions did not affect the firm birth rate in the regions where the R&D 
activity occurs, in regions rich in venture capital it did exhibit a positive effect. The authors 
then concluded that the local availability of venture capital acted as a catalyst to firm creation. 
Two more studies, Chen and Marchioni (2008) and Zucker et al. (1998), have examined 
the linkage between federally-funded R&D and biotechnology firm births and both have 
documented a positive relationship. More specifically, Chen and Marchioni (2008) examined 
the impact of federal research funds given to an MSA over the 2003-2005 period on the 
number of venture capital-backed biotechnology firms in an MSA in 2006.  The level of 
federal funds given to an MSA was used in a principal component analysis along with other 
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indicators, such as the number of life scientists, universities, institutes and hospitals in an 
MSA, in order to construct a composite index of biotechnology research intensity in an MSA. 
In turn, this index was found to have a strong explanatory power in the number of MSA 
biotechnology firm births.  Hence, Chen and Marchioni (2008) provide indirect empirical 
evidence for a positive impact of public R&D funding on biotechnology firm creation but the 
marginal effect of such funding could not be computed.  Zucker et. al (1998) studied the births 
of biotechnology firms in a given U.S. Functional Economic Area in 1990. They evaluated the 
impact of federal funding on firm creation by examining the relationship between the number 
of faculty members in local universities that have received federal grants between 1979 and 
1980 and biotechnology firms ten years later. They found that federal R&D funding had a 
positive impact on biotechnology firm births but, as in the case of Chen and Marchioni (2008), 
the marginal impact of such federal investments on local firm creation was not part of the 
analysis. 
In broad strokes then, existing empirical evidence indicates that: (a) more R&D 
spending tends to increase firm creation; (b) who performs the R&D matters and firm R&D 
activities appear to have a higher marginal impact than university R&D activities on firm 
births; and (c) increased government R&D spending may have a positive effect on firm 
creation under some conditions, especially in the biotechnology industry. The existing 
literature and empirical evidence, however, leave a number of questions unanswered, including 
the most basic one –just how many more firm births might one expect from, say, an additional 
$1 million in public R&D funding in a given region? This is the principle question we address 
in this study within the context of the US biotechnology industry. To answer this question, we 
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make a number of methodological improvements in what we consider to be potential 
limitations in previous studies.  
Specifically, the cycles of R&D grant acquisition, performance of R&D, creation of 
new knowledge, and application of the new knowledge through the creation of new firms can 
be long and variable in length from one year to another. As such, we propose that the 
relationship between public R&D funding and firm creation must be examined over a long 
period of time in order to allow for sufficient lags in the process and year-to-year variations in 
the flows of funds and firms.12  Since the capacity of different types of research institutions to 
translate knowledge into firm births might be different, we also propose that the effects of 
public R&D expenditures on firm creation should be considered separately by the type of 
recipient. Finally, we propose that instead of various indirect indicators of publicly funded 
R&D intensity, a direct measure of public R&D funding (dollars spent) should be used in this 
analysis so that the marginal effects on such spending can be calculated.13  
We implement the proposed improvements in the analysis that follows. More 
specifically, we use a direct measure of public R&D spending; we extend the period of analysis 
to 18 years (1992 to 2010) to ensure adequate consideration of lags and year to year variations 
in R&D investments and firm births; and we partition public R&D funds to those directed to 
universities, private firms and research institutes and hospitals. 
                                                 
12 For instance, in Chen and Marchioni (2008) and Zucker et al. (1998) the time span of public R&D outlays 
measured and the lags between outlays and the new firm counts are rather limited. Chen and Marchioni (2008) 
measure federal R&D spending for a two year period and Zucker et al. (1998) for a one year period. It is therefore 
possible, that the results could weaken or strengthen if their period of analyses were lengthened allowing for 
multiple funding cycles, potential longer lags between funding and firm creation as well as natural variations in 
external conditions that may also affect firm births over time (e.g. overall business climate and conditions in 
financial markets).  
13 Previous measures of public R&D activity have been somewhat crude. In addition to making difficult the 
derivation of a direct measure of the marginal effect of public R&D spending on firm creation, they may also 
distort the potential relationship. For example, the count of faculty members supported by federal grants used in 
Zucker et al. (1998) may mask important differences across the size of grants and accordingly the level of 
knowledge generated and firm created from public R&D funding.  
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Consistent with previous work that finds the impact of R&D activities on firm creation 
to materialize within a narrow geographic scope, we measure the number of firm births at the 
same MSA where federal funds are allocated (Karlsson and Nyström, 2011; Samila and 
Sorenson, 2010).  The MSA is used as the unit of analysis because it is small enough to capture 
the spatially bounded nature of localization economies and the tendency of spinoffs  to locate 
close to parent organizations but it is large enough to exhibit independent economic activity 
(Abel and Deitz, 2012; Samila and Sorenson, 2011).  Further, MSAs are generally more 
homogeneous across U.S. states14 than cities or other geographic units which allows us to 
provide more meaningful comparisons across MSAs of rural and urban regions.   
5. Methods and Procedures  
We specify a two-way fixed effects model in which the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the number of 
biotechnology firm births in Metropolitan Statistical Area 𝑖 and year 𝑡. Given that the 
dependent variable is an observed count, the general form of the expected count is formulated 
as follows: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝐴𝑖 , Γ𝑡) = 𝑚�𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + �𝑎𝑖𝐴𝑖 + � 𝛾𝑡Γ𝑡
𝑡
𝑖
�                                             (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 1 × 13 row vector that contains thirteen non-constant explanatory variables, 
which we describe later in this section.   Function m is a link function that maps the linear 
combination of the explanatory variables into an expected count that is non-negative.15 
                                                 
14 The MSAs are U.S. population centers and exhibit less economic and geographic heterogeneity than the 
component spatial units (e.g., cities, towns, suburbs, villages, neighborhoods, and boroughs). 
15 To estimate the model in (1) we use the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator.  Following earlier contributions 
to this literature, the standard Poisson variance assumption of equal conditional means and variances may be too 
restrictive for much of the economic count data encountered in practice, so we relax this condition in our 
16 
 
The two-way unobserved components in our model are represented with the second and 
third terms in equation (1).  In particular, 𝐴𝑖 equals 1 for MSA 𝑖 and is 0 otherwise, and Γ𝑡 
equals 1 for year 𝑡 and is zero otherwise.  The year dummies can capture time-varying effects, 
such as favorable or unfavorable environments in financial markets on firm births (e.g. a “hot 
IPO market” (Lowry and Schwert, 2002)).  The MSA dummy variables are used to capture 
time-constant factors that may affect firm location choice for a wide range of industries, 
including biotechnology. For example, the MSA dummies can approximate the local effect of 
taxes (Bartik, 1985, 1989; Rathelot and Sillard, 2008) and economic initiatives (Woolley and 
Rottner, 2008), which despite potential deviations from year to year are expected to be largely 
time constant.16 17   
The set of explanatory variables in equation (1) includes the lagged dependent variable 
(i.e., the firm birth rate in each MSA at time 𝑡 − 1) in order to capture potentially dynamic 
relationships in firm births.  Regions conducive to new firm creation are expected to show a 
historical pattern of firm births (Andersson and Koster, 2011), so we expect a positive sign for 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.  We also use the estimate of this coefficient to 
                                                                                                                                                          
estimated model.  When relaxed, the computed standard errors are not sensitive to any conditional variance 
assumption and allow for arbitrary serial correlation (Wooldridge, 1999).   
16 We should note that because some MSAs cross state borders, local taxes and economic initiatives may vary 
within an MSA.  Accordingly, the interpretation of the region-specific dummy variable as a true fixed effect may 
be limited.  As a robustness check, whenever the analysis is limited to the MSAs that do not cross state borders 
the results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. 
17 We have also run fixed effects models using procedures that are included in popular statistical software, such as 
SAS and STATA, (e.g. TCOUNTREG). Unfortunately, some of these procedures are still experimental and as 
such they only report limited fit statistics. Furthermore, the available routines are suitable mainly for one-way 
count panel models but in our application we need to estimate a restricted or partial-two-way model (some cross-
sectional effects are restricted to zero) because some cross-sectional observations have limited variability. In 
addition, in all the procedures we used, the number of observations drops drastically because the standard FE 
Poisson model as described in Wooldridge (2002) drops all observed zeros from the log-likelihood. As a result, 
the sample of such models is quite different from the base model and as such the results are not directly 
comparable. Given all these problems as well as the findings of Greene (2002) that the fixed effects estimator in 
different families of nonlinear models is biased, we opted to not present fixed effects estimates here. 
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distinguish between the short and long run effects of federal funds on the local firm birth rate 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
Since the lagged count variable in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a function of the cross-sectional unobserved 
component (represented by the time-invariant dummy variable Ai in (1)), the presence of 
lagged dependent variables in panel models generally causes bias and inconsistency problems 
in the standard estimators for panel models (Wooldridge, 2002).   For one-way panel models of 
count data, the potential inconsistency problem may be resolved by using quasi-differenced 
data or an instrumental variables estimator.  Given that our data may have two-way unobserved 
components, we use the dummy variable approach, which is roughly comparable to the within 
estimator.  Although the within estimator is also biased for data sets with a fixed temporal 
dimension, the bias converges to zero as the number of time series observations becomes large.  
Our data set has 18 years of time-series observations, so the potential bias in the two-way ML 
estimator of equation (1) may be small for this relatively large data set, and we present 
alternative versions of the estimated model in order to evaluate the evidence of potential bias in 
the estimator. 
 To test whether federal funds relate to local firm births and whether the type of the 
recipient mediates that effect, we include the average total amount of federal grants awarded at 
MSA 𝑖’s universities, private firms and institutes/hospitals from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 − 5 18 in linear and 
quadratic form. The amount of funds that each MSA receives from NIH within a five year 
window is fairly stable due to the common multiyear nature of grants awards.  Due to the 
similarity across adjacent observations of the lagged variables, strong correlations exist among 
                                                 
18 In order to include early years in the empirical analysis, we use a 5 year average for available observations.  For 
example, the observation for 1995 is the average value of years 1992 to 1994, which is a 3 year average.  Thus, 
the empirical analysis only omits data on the dependent variable for 1992. As we show in section 8, this empirical 
choice did not have a noticeable impact on our results. 
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yearly lagged observations, and we employ an average value versus separate year lags in the 
empirical model. We use a five year lag average because the period up to five years before firm 
birth is perhaps the most relevant in capturing the true effects of federal funds because a large 
number of grants expire after the five year window.19 The quadratic form of the variables in 
question is included in the analysis in order to account for potential nonlinearities in the 
relationship between federal R&D monies and firm births at the MSA level.   
In line with our theoretical expectation, we anticipate an overall positive contribution of 
NIH funds to firm births, and the rate may be increasing at an increasing rate (i.e., the quadratic 
coefficient is positive) or increasing at a decreasing rate (i.e., the quadratic coefficient is 
negative).  Also in line with our theoretical expectations, we expect the magnitude of each 
variable that measures the amount of funds provided to a given type of institution to vary 
among types of institutions which would signal that different types of recipients have distinct 
effect on the generation of new firms from federally-funded research.  As well, we include 
three interaction terms (university funds*private firm funds, university funds*research institute 
funds, research institute funds*private firms funds) to account for potential synergies (positive 
sign of the interaction terms) or congestion effects (negative sign of the interaction terms) that 
may arise when funds are allocated to different recipient types/organizational forms in the 
same MSA.   
 To account for time-varying factors that can influence the yearly birth rate of a given 
region we add three relevant control factors in the analysis.  The first control variable is the 
average GDP of the MSA in the five years prior to a firm birth.  The variable is used to capture 
                                                 
19 Previous research has found 5-year windows for lag structures to be appropriate (e.g. Aharonson et al., 2008; 
Baum et al., 2000). As shown in Table 5, to test the robustness of our findings to the specification of the year lag 
structure we specified the relevant variables with different lag structures and found nearly identical results to those 
reported in Table 3.    
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the effect of overall economic conditions on the yearly firm birth rate.  These conditions are 
expected to arise from factors such as regional cost advantages, amenities and a region’s 
prestige (Bartik and Gray, 2002; Frenkel, 2001; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003b). Given the highly 
localized nature of venture capital investments in biotechnology (Kolympiris et al., 2011; 
Powell et al., 2002) and the contribution of venture capital to regional firm birth rate (Samila 
and Sorenson, 2010, 2011) the second control variable is the average total venture capital funds 
invested in biotechnology firms in the MSA in the five years prior to a firm birth. We expect a 
positive sign for the variable in question.  Note that the two aforementioned control variables 
are specified as 5-year averages so that we could compare them with the corresponding 
variables that measure the 5-year average inflow of NIH dollars at a given MSA.  To ensure 
that our empirical analysis is robust to the size of the MSA, we also include a control variable 
for the population of the MSA at year t. 
6. Data Sources and Presentation 
The data used to construct the variables that measure the yearly federal funds allocated to 
universities, private firms, and research institutes/hospitals (and the associated interaction and 
quadratic terms) were obtained from NIH’s Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools 
(RePORT). We collected data from 199220 to 2010 on the amount awarded by NIH to every 
principal investigator (PI) as well as each funded project’s title and each PI’s affiliation at the 
                                                 
20 The effect of NIH money on local firm births could have been larger in the early years because the industry may 
have not attained complete maturity during these years.  Accordingly, firm births prior to 1992 would also be of 
interest to the present study.  Unfortunately, 1992 is the first year for which NIH data are available. Further, the 
boom in the biotechnology industry occurred some years later than 1992, so 1992 is still among the early years. 
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time the project was funded.21 In order to identify biotechnology grants, a keyword search was 
performed for all project titles22.  After we sorted out the biotechnology grants, we adjusted the 
nominal award money to 2007 values using the CPI and classified each project’s PI affiliation 
to universities, private firms and research institutes/ hospitals after consulting with the 
categorization of each institution as private firm, university and so on provided by RePORT.  
Whenever in doubt, we visited each institution’s website.  Then, we constructed the MSA-
specific explanatory variables by adding the inflation adjusted award monies for each type of 
institution23.   
Figure 1 presents the historical real NIH funding levels for biotechnology by institution 
type.  Biotechnology funds increased through the 1990s, flattened-out between 2003 and 2004, 
and stabilized starting in 2005. The proportion of funds directed to the different types of 
institutions remained stable over time mainly because most grants are multiyear awards.  
Universities attract the largest share of the funds while private firms receive the least amount of 
                                                 
21 NIH’s RePORT reports the PI and the institution that each project is awarded. It is possible that the PI may have 
more than one affiliation. Nevertheless, this does not present a problem as we allocate the funds to the institution 
reported in the NIH grant. NIH grants are made, principally, to an institution rather than a PI and as such the 
research is expected to occur in the recipient institution listed in the award. While no official statistics exist, 
information provided by the Office of Statistical Analysis and Reporting (OSAR) of NIH, indicates that the 
majority of NIH grants are individually allocated to a single institution and a single PI. As such, we allocate all 
awarded monies in each grant to the location of the primary recipient institution and PI. For the small number of 
NIH grants involving multiple institutions, this attribution scheme might lead to misallocation of funding among 
institutions and locations but we do not expect this type of error to be significant. We indirectly tested for the 
significance of such a potential error by taking advantage of a recent change in NIH grant awards. Specifically, 
since the beginning of 2007, NIH has allowed grants to have multiple investigators (Brainard, 2006). When we re-
estimated our base model on a limited data set for the 1992-2007 period, we found the results to be qualitatively 
similar to the results of Table 3, where the analysis extended to 2010.  
22 The list of biotechnology keywords was constructed after consulting with biotechnology researchers employed 
at the authors’ institutions. Almost 400 keywords were used but 155 of them characterized 99% of all grants in 
our dataset. The abbreviated list is presented in Appendix Table 1. It should be noted that medical and 
biotechnology research often overlap. There are, however, many cases of medical research that is different from 
biotechnology. Examples include research on clinical diagnostics, clinical test kits, infectious diseases and 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).   
23 Starting in 2007, NIH implemented a new system to measure the amount of funds for biotechnology. Our 
measure of biotechnology funds, which is comparable to the updated NIH system, is conservative when compared 
to the original NIH estimate; the 2007 real total biotechnology amount estimate of NIH is about 5 billion dollars 
while our estimate for the same year is about 3 billion dollars. 
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grants from NIH24. Interestingly, as seen in Table 1, the correlation coefficients between 
monies for the different types of institutions on a per-MSA-year base are moderate, ranging 
from 0.52 to 0.57. The magnitude of those correlations suggests that there is variation in 
funding levels across the different types of institutions within the MSAs, and this should help 
us to estimate the separate effects of the funds on firm births. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 1 about here] 
 We used the Thomson’s Financial SDC Platinum Database, the Zoominfo web-based 
database, and the web-based Moneytree report to identify biotechnology firm births and to 
construct the dependent variable and the time lag variable.  Each firm’s location and founding 
date were generally available in all three data sources, but missing observations were gathered 
from the websites of the individual firms.  All three data-sources report firms that during their 
lifetime received funds from venture capital firms. Perhaps due to the highly selective nature of 
venture capital investments, venture capital-backed firms are often overperforming and 
generate substantial revenues and associated increases in value added and jobs; they are then 
precisely the type of firms that Shane (2009) argues public policy should focus on.25 By 
extension, venture capital-backed firms appear a suitable sample for our study.26 27 Figure 2 
                                                 
24 NIH is currently required to set aside 2.5 percent of its extramural R&D budget exclusively for grants of the 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program (Wessner (ed.), 2009) which mainly go to private firms. The 
required percentage has slightly fluctuated over time but some of the NIH funds issued to private firms are SBIR 
grants.  Also note that the majority of funds for private firms do not come from the federal government but from 
other sources like venture capital funds.  Hence, the overall firm-generation capacity of private firms will be 
underestimated here because we do not include the total research amount received by private firms (besides NIH 
funds). 
25 Shane (2009) even suggests that the criteria used by venture capitalists in choosing the firms they invest in 
should be adopted by federal agencies, such as NIH, that provide funds.   
26 Approximately 80 percent of the firms were common in all three databases but SDC was more comprehensive 
in reporting the foundation date of each firm as well as its address, which were the two main pieces of information 
we sought from these data sources in order to assign the birth of each firm to an MSA at a certain year. 
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presents the number of firm births by year, which exhibit an increasing trend over time even 
though year to year variations are substantial.  Firm births peaked in 2000 with 102 new 
biotechnology firms and declined after 2005.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
To illustrate the spatial character of firm births, Figure 3 presents the cumulative 
amount of NIH grants collected from 1992 to 2010 for all MSAs in the U.S. along with their 
cumulative firm births for the same period. Each MSA is represented by its principal city as 
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau; for those MSAs with two principal cities, the more 
geographically central city in the MSA is depicted in the map.  MSAs are classified according 
to their NIH fund accumulations, and larger symbols in the figure indicate MSAs with more 
biotechnology firm births. The general pattern observed from Figure 3 is that the MSAs that 
host institutions that have attracted large amounts from NIH have also experienced more firm 
births.  Only 12 percent of the MSAs (9 of 75) with the highest NIH fund accumulations did 
not have any firm births while the corresponding percentage for MSAs with lower or no NIH 
fund accumulations was 76 percent (107 of the 140) and 97 percent (151 of the 156), 
respectively.  For example, Boston’s MSA had 181 firm births and the largest funds 
accumulation of all MSAs with more than $4.1 billion from 1992 to 2010.  Also, San Francisco 
                                                                                                                                                          
Importantly, for about 90 percent of the firms we used to construct our dependent variable SDC provided the 
status of each firm as of the end of 2010, which is the year our analysis ends. The large majority of the firms were 
in business for at least 7 years after their births and some were merged or acquired.     
27 Although venture capital–backed firms often locate where venture capital investments occur, because of our 
focus on firms of this kind we may have overlooked some firms in regions with less venture capital activity, 
which could lead to a potential bias in our estimates. In general, we do not expect this issue to be important as 60 
percent of the firms in our sample were founded outside the three traditional venture capital hubs of San 
Francisco, Boston and San Diego. Furthermore, existing empirical evidence from a broad set of industries 
indicates that the effect of regional venture capital activity per se on firm foundings is not particularly strong 
(Samila and Sorenson, 2010, 2011). Empirical evidence from the biotechnology industry suggests that the impact 
of venture capital activity on firm births is either weakly positive and lessens even more when other factors (e.g. 
university presence) are explicitly considered (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003a) or it is negative, potentially due to the 
fact that venture capital activity favors the creation of a small number of large firms (Zucker et al., 1998). 
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had 201 firm births while having the 6th highest total NIH fund accumulation.  In contrast, Los 
Angeles had only 27 firm births while having received the 3rd total largest amount from NIH 
with more than $2 billion from 1992 to 2010.  While Figure 3 implies a positive association 
between firm births and total NIH funds, it does not provide a comprehensive picture of the 
relationship under consideration because it does not account for temporal, spatial, and other 
structural effects that might shape firm firms in various locations. The estimated count data 
model is therefore expected to provide more specific evidence on the conditional impact of 
NIH funds on firm births across the U.S.  
For the remaining variables, we used data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
to construct the GDP for each MSA and we transformed the nominal GDP values to 2007 
dollars using the CPI. Data available at the U.S. Census Bureau was employed to form the 
MSA population variable.  Finally, the variable that measured the venture capital investments 
at a given MSA was built with data from the SDC Platinum database.  SDC provided the 
nominal venture capital amounts awarded to biotechnology firms per year. In order to construct 
the variable in question, we converted these amounts to 2007 dollars using the CPI and 
summed up the values for all firms located in each MSA. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and selected 
independent variables. The average number of firm births per MSA year is 0.18 with a standard 
deviation of 1.  The dependent variable is right-skewed because most of the MSAs did not have 
any firm births in a given year.  On average, universities receive about $3.69 million per MSA 
year, research institutes receive about $1 million per MSA year, and private firms attract about 
$0.12 million per MSA year.  Note that regardless of the type of the institution, the standard 
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deviation of NIH funds is greater than the variable mean, which indicates the wide range of 
values in the observed funding levels. As with the dependent variable, these explanatory 
variables exhibit strong right skewness because most observations in a given year equal zero. 
Most MSAs did not receive biotechnology-related funds from venture capitalists but the 
relative size of the standard deviation of the average venture capital invested as compared with 
its mean (36.8 versus 4.9) indicates that when (and where) venture capital investments 
occurred, they were of significant magnitude.  Finally, the average GDP for a given MSA was 
almost $19 billion with most MSAs having a GDP of more than $2.4 billion. 
[Table 2 about here] 
7. Estimation Results 
The fit statistics reported at the bottom of Table 3 come from a maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation of the previously described Poisson count model which was based on an exponential 
specification for the conditional mean28. Note, however, that there might be unobserved or 
difficult to measure time-varying regional characteristics (for instance, the quality of support 
towards entrepreneurship provided in the MSA) that can boost or hinder the firm birth rate in a 
given MSA across years. If such unobserved factors do exist, they may lead to a violation in 
the assumption of independence across observations (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007; Stimson, 
1985).  For this reason we compute standard errors clustered at the MSA level using 
generalized estimating equations (GEE).29 This practice accounts for potential clustering 
                                                 
28For the cross-sectional fixed effects, the ML estimators of these parameters are only identified when the 
associated dependent variable exhibits changes during the sample period (Allison, 2008). Accordingly, the set of 
MSA-specific dummies was defined as the set of 104 MSAs that over the sample period had at least one firm 
birth, and we use a partial or restricted form of the fixed effects specification.  
29 GEE is a method to estimate the standard errors which first estimates the variability within the defined cluster 
and then sums across all clusters (Zorn, 2006). 
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effects and yields identical estimates to ML. These last estimates of the fitted Poisson count 
model are reported in the first column of Table 3. As we discuss in detail in Section 8, a 
number of robustness checks suggest that our estimates are generally consistent across 
different estimators, sets of regressors, lag structures, and model specifications. 
To evaluate the potential bias due to the presence of the fixed effects and the lagged 
dependent variables in (1), we estimate an alternative model and report the results in the 
second column of Table 3.  The second model includes all the independent variables previously 
discussed except the temporal lag.  The small differences between the estimates of the two 
models suggest that the temporal lag does not induce substantial bias in the ML parameter 
estimators.  Accordingly, in the following discussion we refer only to the estimates of the full 
model in the first column. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The joint significance tests reported at the bottom of Table 3 indicate strong 
significance for the MSA-specific and the year-specific variables30 31.  As well, the condition 
number for the set of explanatory variables (39.67) reduces inference concerns that relate to 
multicollinearity because it is within the range of the generally regarded as safe level of 30 and 
well below the worrisome condition number of 100 (Belsley et al., 1980).   
                                                 
30 We also estimated models with one-way (only MSA-specific) fixed effects, and these have largely similar 
results with those reported in Table 3. 
31 Separate year-specific and MSA-specific fixed effects were mostly statistically significant as well and are not 
reported in Table 3 for ease of exposition. Importantly, the significance of the MSA-specific dummy variables 
suggests that time-invariant characteristics such as fiscal policies at the regional level have an impact on the 
location patterns of biotechnology firm births. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
The estimated coefficients for the NIH variables are largely positive and provide 
empirical support to the proposition that federal R&D spending contributes to local 
biotechnology firm births.  Because the NIH funding variables for the recipient institutions 
appear in multiple terms (i.e., linear, quadratic, and cross-product terms), we have to combine 
the individual marginal effects to evaluate the overall marginal effect from NIH funding on 
firm births.  The semi-elasticities for the three recipient types are reported for the two 
estimated Poisson models in Table 4.  For research universities, the results of Table 4 indicate 
that, on average, an additional $1 million of public R&D funding awarded to universities over 
a 5 year period is expected to generate in the following year an increase of 5.93 percent in local 
firm births per MSA.  Regarding the short run and long run effects of federal money on local 
firm births32, the estimated long-run effect is close to 2 percent higher than the short-run effect 
(0.0612 and 0.0623 respectively). 
With regard to the marginal effect of federal R&D funds awarded to private firms on 
the regional firm birth rate, the estimated semi-elasticity reported in Table 4 implies that, on 
average, an additional $1 million of federal R&D funds awarded to private firms over a 5 year 
period is expected to increase the number of local firm births in the following year by 58.11 
percent per MSA.  This finding provides empirical support to the proposition that the impact of 
federal R&D funding on firm creation is sensitive to the recipient type.  What makes this 
finding striking is the sheer difference in magnitude. Federal R&D funding directed to private 
firms is found to have an impact on firm creation that is almost ten times larger than that 
directed to research universities.  This difference is consistent with the findings of previous 
                                                 
32 The long run effect is estimated with 𝛽 / 1 − 𝛾  where 𝛽 is the short run effect and 𝛾 is the estimated coefficient 
of the lagged births variable (Wooldridge, 2009).  
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studies that document differential effects between industrial and academic R&D on firm births 
(Bade and Nerlinger, 2000; Karlsson and Nyström, 2011). Similar to the results for 
universities, the estimated short-run and long-run multipliers for private firms are nearly 
identical, and the marginal effects do not exhibit a higher order relationship that is 
economically relevant. 
 With regards to federal R&D funds awarded to research institutes and hospitals we find 
that the impact of such funds on local biotechnology firm creation is slightly lower than that of 
research universities but substantially lower than that of private firms.  In particular, our results 
show that, on average, an additional $1 million of federal R&D funds awarded to research 
institutes/hospitals in a five year period is expected to increase the number of biotechnology 
firm births in the following year by about 5 percent for the MSA of interest. Given that unlike 
private firms, universities and research institutes are not driven mainly by profit maximization, 
a possible impetus of the observed difference may be the potential tendency of private firms to 
direct their efforts mainly towards the end of research with higher commercial value. It may 
also be the result of diminishing returns of public R&D funding to firm creation (note the 
difference in the relative size of  public R&D spending in universities and private firms), or 
some other factor.   
 The statistical insignificance of the lagged dependent variable suggests that prior local 
firm births do not have strong explanatory power in the rate of local firm formation and the 
same holds for venture capital investments, the size of the MSA and its economic growth.   
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8. Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our findings we performed a number of tests and we 
present the results in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
First, we tested for the case under which our results are influenced by a “virtuous cycle” where 
funds go to regions that already host many firms and in turn (mainly due to the enhanced 
capacity of firms to generate new firms from federal funds) these regions end up with more 
firms. To address the issue, we computed the annual NIH funds towards private firms in the 
same MSA measuring only those funds that went to firms that were at least seven years old33. 
As shown in Model 1 in Table 5, the results once again indicate that federal funds towards 
incumbent firms promote local firm births and imply that the estimates reported in Table 3 may 
represent a lower bound on the impact of such funds on the local startup rate. The estimates of 
the university and institutes impacts are in the same range with the estimates of Table 3 but the 
institute impact is no longer statistically significant.   
The estimated scale parameter for the Poisson model reported in Table 3 indicates 
under-dispersion in the variance of the dependent variable (i.e., the observed variance is less 
than a standard Poisson random variable), which may be due to the large number of 
observations with a zero count34. Due to this potential under-dispersion, we also constructed a 
Generalized Poisson model (Famoye, 1993; Famoye and Singh, 2003)  which has properties 
that are appropriate for under-dispersed data (Hilbe, 2011). The results of this model are 
                                                 
33 We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for pointing this potential issue and for suggesting ways to address 
it. 
34 The Poisson model with the variance equal to the mean is not reported in Table 3 because the Poisson variance 
assumption was not supported by the data. 
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presented as Model 2 in Table 5 and are qualitatively similar35 with the results presented in 
Table 3. 
In Model 3 we present estimates of a linear probability model that tests the sensitivity 
of our results to the exclusion of MSAs without firm births across years from the analysis that 
relates to the Maximum Likelihood estimator we used for the count models. In Model 3, those 
MSAs are included in the analysis.  Although OLS ignores the count feature of the dependent 
variable, the estimates largely corroborate our previous findings that funds directed towards 
private firms have a much stronger marginal effect on local firm births than funds directed 
towards universities and research institutes/hospitals.  
Another estimator that ignores the count feature of our data but addresses potential 
endogeneity between the dependent and the independent variables is the Arellano-Bond 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991)36.  In our application, in Model 4, we use it to test the 
possibility that our estimates are plagued by the potential endogeneity of the lagged dependent 
variable. The estimated coefficients do not provide evidence that such an issue is present in our 
models.    
Models 5 to 8 test the sensitivity of our estimates to the model specification. In 
particular, we build models that include each funding category separately and then a model that 
does not include the interaction terms. The estimates of these models are largely comparable 
with the estimates presented in Table 3. 
                                                 
35 The main difference is the statistical significance of the quadratic terms. But, their magnitude is so small that it 
suggests a nearly nonexistent economic impact from these higher-order terms. 
36 To construct the instruments we use a one year lag of the independent variables, which we model as weakly 
exogenous implying that we allow for the case that they are correlated both with “past and...possibly current 
realization of the error” (pg. 86 Roodman, 2009). Different configurations of the set of variables we use to 
construct the instruments yield qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 5. The estimates presented in 
Model 4 of Table 5 are derived from the Arellano -Bond system estimator, which, in our application, yields 
similar estimates to the difference estimator.  
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Models 9 and 10 are built to test the robustness of our estimates to the construction of 
the time lag we used to estimate the effect of federal funds (5 year average). In model 9, the 5 
year average lag is replaced by a one year lag and in model 10 the 5 year average lag is 
replaced by a 3 year average lag. Both models suggest that the choice of the lag structure does 
not significantly impact the results. 
Finally, as we note at the bottom of Table 3 in order to include early years in the 
empirical analysis, we use a 5 year average for available observations where for example, the 
observation for 1995 is the average value of years 1992 to 1994, which is a 3 year average.  In 
model 11 we test the potential influence of that choice in our estimates and build models that 
use observations only after 1997. The results are nearly identical to those presented in Table 3. 
In conclusion, the tests we conducted support the overall conclusions we have drawn 
from our main results reported in Table 3 and indicate that our findings are robust to alternative 
model specifications and data constructions.  
9. Summary, Discussion and Concluding Comments 
Partly due to a strategic decision of the U.S. government to substantially increase funding 
towards R&D in order to boost the U.S. economy during the severe downturn of the late 2000s, 
interest in the relationship between public R&D spending and economic growth has been 
revitalized.  A longstanding academic literature has established that public funding matters for 
economic growth as it increases innovation, productivity and the like.  Nevertheless, the impact 
of public R&D funding on the creation of new firms has received little attention despite strong 
theoretical constructs that support the association.  Indeed, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between public R&D funding and firm creation has been scant and indirect.   
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In this study, we have analyzed the relationship between federal R&D funds and local 
firm births in the U.S. biotechnology industry and our findings suggest that government R&D 
spending has a positive impact on firm creation. Our results, therefore, corroborate the 
empirical evidence that has been provided by a handful of previous studies that have also found 
a positive relationship between public R&D funds and regional firm births, especially in the 
biotechnology industry. Our analysis focused on biotechnology because it is central to the 
knowledge economy; it is a heavy recipient of federal research funds; it displays a close 
linkage between basic research and commercial application; and it tends to cluster around 
geographies and institutions that receive significant government R&D funding.  As such, we 
presumed that if a positive relationship between public R&D spending and firm creation exists, 
it should be evident in the biotechnology industry.  
By developing separate measures of the effect of federal R&D funds awarded to 
different types of recipient research institutions, we find that public funds dispensed for R&D 
to existing firms have, proportionally, a much stronger positive impact on local firm births than 
funds directed to universities and research institutes/hospitals. We also find that temporal and 
spatial factors in our analysis (two-way fixed effects) explain part of the variation in the birth 
rate of biotechnology firms across different Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S. Hence, 
year-to-year variation in market conditions (e.g. “hot IPO” markets) as well as regional 
differences in infrastructure, business climate, taxes, initiatives and other factors tend to 
condition the overall impact of public R&D funding on firm creation. These findings reinforce 
our view that analysis of the relationship between public R&D spending and firm creation must 
be done over a long period of time and across large geographies to allow for lags as well as 
spatial and temporal variation that are inherent in such a relationship.   
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The specific quantitative results in our study are of particular interest. We find that, 
depending on the recipient of funds, a $1 million increase in the average amount of federal 
R&D funding associates with an increase of 5 to 58 percent in the number of local 
biotechnology firm births a few years later. Therefore, the magnitude of the effect has a 
considerable range. The specific size of this marginal effect is important because it relates to 
the job-creation process and other direct economic benefits associated with entrepreneurship 
and firm creation (Van Praag and Versloot, 2007). Given that such marginal effects have not 
been produced in other studies, it is important that future studies confirm and refine them. 
Having a deeper understanding of such marginal effects across sectors and geographies as well 
as of the conditions that determine them could boost the overall impact of public R&D funding 
on economic growth and employment. It could also provide a more accurate accounting of the 
extent public R&D funding corrects market failures in certain knowledge sectors.  
Measurement of the marginal effects of public R&D on firm creation, like those we 
provide in this study, may also offer useful insights in the debate about the gradual emergence 
of the entrepreneurial university, which in addition to its teaching and research mission, 
promotes local firm births and economic development (Etzkowitz, 1998).  Our empirical 
estimates suggest that publicly funded R&D in universities and research institutes has a 
positive impact on local firm creation. Characterizing the differences in such marginal effects 
between universities and private firms as well as across locations and sectors may help identify 
their sources and improve the efficiency of the entrepreneurial universities and their impact on 
local economies through the creation of new ventures.  
Before closing, we note that our empirical models contain some unexplained variance.  
This variance can be reduced in a number of ways.  We have discussed a number of 
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mechanisms that have been identified in the literature and could explain the differences in the 
marginal effects of public R&D spending we found in this study. However, we have not tested 
the relevance of such mechanisms in our analysis.  Explicitly accounting for the mechanisms 
that shape the differential impact of government R&D spending on firm creation across 
recipient institutions, is an important area for further investigation.  Also, we treat all 
institutions in our three fund recipient categories (university, private firm, and research 
institute or hospital) as homogeneous (aside from MSA-specific difference), but there are 
distinct types of academic institutions (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003) or private firms that may 
affect the local rate of associated firm births differently.  Future research can determine if these 
within-group differences are significant and how the different types of subgroups perform.  
Finally, data limitations do not allow us to directly account for the network ties in the 
biotechnology industry that have been noted in previous work. Testing whether federal funds 
influence the creation of such ties, which can promote local firm creation, could yield 
important insights.   
34 
 
Acknowledgements 
Research funding provided by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Strategic Grant 
#20050176 is gratefully acknowledged.  An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 
35th DRUID Celebration Conference at ESADE Business School in Barcelona, Spain. We 
thank Peter Klein and James Kaufman for valuable inputs during the development of the paper 
and Sebastian Hoenen and Lifeng Tu for assistance in data collection. 
References  
Abel, J., Deitz, R., 2012. Do Colleges and Universities Increase Their Region’s Human 
Capital? Journal of Economic Geography 12, 667-691. 
Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B., Feldman, M.P., 1994. R&D spillovers and innovative activity. 
Managerial and Decision Economics 15, 131-138. 
Acs, Z.J., Braunerhjelm, P., Audretsch, D.B., Carlsson, B., 2009. The knowledge spillover 
theory of entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics 32, 15-30. 
Agarwal, R., Echambadi, R., Franco, A.M., Sarkar, M.B., 2004. Knowledge Transfer Through 
Inheritance: Spin-out Generation, Development, and Survival. Academy of 
Management Journal 47, 501-522. 
Aharonson, B.S., Baum, J.A.C., Plunket, A., 2008. Inventive and uninventive clusters: The 
case of Canadian biotechnology. Research Policy 37, 1108-1131. 
Allison, P.D., 2008. Convergence failures in logistic regression, p. 2008. 
Andersson, M., Koster, S., 2011. Sources of persistence in regional start-up rates—evidence 
from Sweden. Journal of Economic Geography 11, 179. 
Anselin, L., Varga, A., Acs, Z.J., 1997. Local geographic spillovers between university 
research and high technology innovations. Journal of Urban Economics 42, 422-448. 
Anselin, L., Varga, A., Acs, Z.J., 2000. Geographic and sectoral characteristics of academic 
knowledge externalities. Papers in Regional Science 79, 435-443. 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-
297. 
Argyres, N.S., Liebeskind, J.P., 1998. Privatizing the intellecutal commons: Universities and 
the commercialization of biotechnology. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
35, 427. 
Arrow, K., 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in: Nelson, 
R.R. (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press, 
Prinveton, NJ. 
Arrow, K., 1971. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for R&D, in: Arrow, K. 
(Ed.), Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. American Elsevier, New York. 
Audretsch, D.B., 1998. Agglomeration and the location of innovative activity. Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 14, 18. 
Audretsch, D.B., Keilbach, M., 2007. The Theory of Knowledge Spillover Entrepreneurship. 
Journal of Management Studies 44, 1242-1254. 
Audretsch, D.B., Stephan, P.E., 1996. Company-Scientist Locational Links: The Case of 
Biotechnology. American Economic Review 86, 641-652. 
35 
 
Audretsch, D.B., Stephan, P.E., 1999. Knowledge spillovers in biotechnology: sources and 
incentives. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 9, 97-107. 
Bade, F.-J., Nerlinger, E.A., 2000. The Spatial Distribution of New Technology-Based Firms: 
Empirical Results for West-Germany. Papers in Regional Science 79, 155-176. 
Baptista, R., Mendonça, J., 2010. Proximity to knowledge sources and the location of 
knowledge-based start-ups. Annals of Regional Science 45, 5-29. 
Bartik, T.J., 1985. Business Location Decisions in the United States: Estimates of the Effects 
of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States. Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics 3, 14-22. 
Bartik, T.J., 1989. Small Business Start-Ups in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of 
Characteristics of States. Southern Economic Journal 55, 1004-1018. 
Bartik, T.J., Gray, W.B., 2002. The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Business Location 
in the United States, Economic costs and consequences of environmental regulation. 
International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy.Aldershot, U.K. and 
Burlington, Vt.:Ashgate, Dartmouth, pp. 129-151. 
Basken, P., 2012. In Budget Battle, Science Faces New Pressures to Prove It Delivers, The 
Chronicle of Higher Education. 
Bathelt, H., Malmberg, A., Maskell, P., 2004. Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, global 
pipelines and the process of knowledge creation. Progress in Human Geography, 31-56. 
Baum, J.A.C., Calabrese, T., Silverman, B.S., 2000. Don't go it alone: Alliance network 
composition and startups' performance in Canadian biotechnology. Strategic 
Management Journal 21, 267-294. 
Beise, M., Stahl, H., 1999. Public research and industrial innovations in Germany. Research 
Policy 28, 397-422. 
Belsley, D.A., Kuh, E., Welsch, R.E., 1980. Regression diagnostics. Wiley Online Library. 
Bernanke, B., 2011. Promoting Research and Development: The Government’s Role, Speech 
at the Conference on “New Building Blocks for Jobs and Economic Growth.” 
Washington, D.C. 
Bhide, A., 1994. How Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies That Work. Harvard Business Review 72, 
150-161. 
Brainard, J., 2006. NIH Allows Multiple Principal Investigators on Grants and Stops 
Compiling Departmental Rankings, The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
Breschi, S., Lissoni, F., 2001. Localised knowledge spillovers vs. innovative milieux: 
Knowledge “tacitness” reconsidered. Papers in Regional Science 80, 255-273. 
Chachamidou, M., Logothetidis, S., 2008. Spin-off creation behaviour of universities and 
research institutions: an initial approach for nanotechnology. International Journal of 
Technology Transfer & Commercialisation 7, 384-397. 
Chaminade, C., Edquist, C., 2006. Rationales for public policy intervention in the innovation 
process: A systems of innovation approach, in: Smits, E.R., Kuhlmann, S., Shapira, P. 
(Eds.), The Theory and Practice of Innovation Policy. An International Research 
Handbook. . Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 95-114. 
Chen, K., Marchioni, M., 2008. Spatial Clustering of Venture Capital-Financed Biotechnology 
Firms in the U.S. Industrial Geographer 5, 19-38. 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A., 1989. Innovation and learning: the two faces of R & D. 
Economic Journal 99, 569-596. 
36 
 
Dahl, M.S., Pedersen, C.Ø.R., 2004. Knowledge flows through informal contacts in industrial 
clusters: myth or reality? Research Policy 33, 1673-1686. 
Di Gregorio, D., Shane, S., 2003. Why Do Some Universities Generate More Start-Ups Than 
Others? Research Policy 32, 209-227. 
DiMasi, J.A., Grabowski, H.G., 2007. The cost of biopharmaceutical R&D: Is biotech 
different? Managerial and Decision Economics 28, 469-479. 
Dohse, D., 2000. Technology policy and the regions—the case of the BioRegio contest. 
Research Policy 29, 1111-1133. 
Döring, T., Schnellenbach, J., 2006. What do we know about geographical knowledge 
spillovers and regional growth?: A survey of the literature. Regional Studies 40, 375-
395. 
Ernst&Young, 2012. Beyond Borders: Global Biotechnology Report 2012. 
Etzkowitz, H., 1998. The norms of entrepreneurial science: cognitive effects of the new 
university-industry linkages. Research Policy 27, 823. 
Famoye, F., 1993. Restricted generalized Poisson regression model. Communications in 
statistics. Theory and methods 22, 1335-1354. 
Famoye, F., Singh, K., 2003. On Inflated Generalized Poisson Regression Models. Advances 
and Applications in Statistics 3, 13. 
Feldman, M.P., Kelley, M.R., 2006. The ex ante assessment of knowledge spillovers: 
Government R&D policy, economic incentives and private firm behavior. Research 
Policy 35, 1509-1521. 
Fischer, M.M., Varga, A., 2003. Spatial knowledge spillovers and university research: 
evidence from Austria. Annals of Regional Science 37, 303-322. 
Frenkel, A., 2001. Why High-technology Firms Choose to Locate in or near Metropolitan 
Areas. Urban Studies 38, 1083-1102. 
Garvin, D.A., 1983. Spin-Offs and the New Firm Formation Process. California Management 
Review 25, 3-20. 
Goetz, S.J., Morgan, R.S., 1995. State-level locational determinants of biotechnology firms. 
Economic Development Quarterly 9, 174. 
Greene, W., 2002. The bias of the fixed effects estimator in nonlinear models. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Griliches, Z., 1992. The search for R&D spillovers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94, 
29-47. 
Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 1992. Innovation and growth in the global economy. MIT 
press. 
Hall, B.H., 1996. The private and social returns to research and development, in: Smith, 
B.L.R., Barefield, C.E. (Eds.), Technology, R&D, and the Economy. Brookings 
Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC., pp. 140-183. 
Hand, E., 2009. Science grants rise with stimulus spending, Nature. 
Haussler, C., Zademach, H.-M., 2007. Cluster performance reconsidered: Structure, linkages 
and paths in the German biotechnology industry, 1996-2003. Schmalenbach Business 
Review (SBR) 59, 261-281. 
Hilbe, J.M., 2011. Negative binomial regression. Cambridge Univ Pr. 
Jaffe, A.B., 1989. Real effects of academic research. American Economic Review, 957-970. 
Karlsson, C., Nyström, K., 2011. Knowledge accessibility and new firm formation, in: Desai, 
S., Nijkamp, P., Stough, R.R. (Eds.), NEW DIRECTIONS IN REGIONAL 
37 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Northampton, 
Massachusetts, pp. 174-197. 
Kenney, M., 1986. Biotechnology: The university industrial complex. Yale University Press. 
Kim, J., Marschke, G., 2005. Labor Mobility of Scientists, Technological Diffusion, and the 
Firm's Patenting Decision. RAND Journal of Economics 36, 298-317. 
Kim, Y., Kim, W., Yang, T., 2011. The effect of the triple helix system and habitat on regional 
entrepreneurship: Empirical evidence from the US. Research Policy 41, 154-166. 
Kirchhoff, B.A., Newbert, S.L., Hasan, I., Armington, C., 2007. The Influence of University R 
& D Expenditures on New Business Formations and Employment Growth. 
Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 31, 543-559. 
Klepper, S., Sleeper, S., 2005. Entry by Spinoffs. Management Science 51, 1291-1306. 
Klevorick, A.K., Levin, R.C., Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1995. On the sources and 
significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities. Research Policy 
24, 185-205. 
Kolympiris, C., Kalaitzandonakes, N., 2013. Geographic scope of proximity effects among 
small life sciences firms. Small Business Economics 40, 1059-1086. 
Kolympiris, C., Kalaitzandonakes, N., Miller, D., 2011. Spatial collocation and venture capital 
in the US biotechnology industry. Research Policy 40, 1188-1199. 
Lazonick, W., Tulum, Ö., 2011. US biopharmaceutical finance and the sustainability of the 
biotech business model. Research Policy 40, 1170-1187. 
Ledbetter, A., Zipkin, I., 2002. Achieving venture returns through corporate spinouts. Journal 
of Commercial Biotechnology 8, 339. 
Liebeskind, J.P., Oliver, A.L., Zucker, L.G., Brewer, M.B., 1996. Social networks, learning, 
and flexibility: Sourcing scientific knowledge in new biotechnology firms. 
Organization Science, 428-443. 
Lockett, A., Wright, M., 2005. Resources, Capabilities, Risk Capital and the Creation of 
University Spin-Out Companies. Research Policy 34, 1043-1057. 
Lowry, M., Schwert, G., 2002. IPO market cycles: Bubbles or sequential learning? Journal of 
Finance 57, 1171-1200. 
Mansfield, E., 1991. Academic research and industrial innovation. Research Policy 20, 1-12. 
Mansfield, E., 1995. Academic research underlying industrial innovations: sources, 
characteristics, and financing. Review of Economics and Statistics, 55-65. 
Mansfield, E., 1997. Academic research and industrial innovation: An update of empirical 
findings. Research Policy 26, 773-776. 
McMillan, G.S., Narin, F., 2000. An analysis of the critical role of public science in 
innovation: the case of biotechnology. Research Policy 29, 1. 
Mervis, J., 2009. Amid the Gloom, Researchers Prepare for a Boom in Funding. Science 323, 
1274-1275. 
Narin, F., Hamilton, K.S., Olivastro, D., 1997. The increasing linkage between US technology 
and public science. Research Policy 26, 317-330. 
Ndonzuau, F.N., Pirnay, F., Surlemont, B., 2002. A stage model of academic spin-off creation. 
Technovation 22, 281. 
Nelson, R.R., 1959. The simple economics of basic scientific research. The Journal of Political 
Economy 67, 297-306. 
Nichols, A., Schaffer, M.E., 2007. Clustered standard errors in Stata, United Kingdom Stata 
Users' Group Meetings 2007. Stata Users Group. 
38 
 
Orsenigo, L., Pammolli, F., Riccaboni, M., 2001. Technological change and network dynamics 
- Lessons from the pharmaceutical industry. Research Policy 30, 485-508. 
Owen-Smith, J., Powell, W.W., 2004. Knowledge networks as channels and conduits: The 
effects of spillovers in the Boston biotechnology community. Organization Science 15, 
5-21. 
Pisano, G., 2006. Can science be a business? Harvard Business Review 10, 1-12. 
Pouder, R., St. John, C.H., 1996. Hot spots and blind spots; geographic clusters of firms and 
innovation. Academy of Management Review 21, 1192-1225. 
Powell, W.W., 1996. Inter-organizational collaboration in the biotechnology industry. Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 197-215. 
Powell, W.W., Koput, K.W., Bowie, J.I., Smith-Doerr, L., 2002. The spatial clustering of 
science and capital: Accounting for biotech firm-venture capital relationships. Regional 
Studies 36, 291-305. 
Powell, W.W., Koput, K.W., Smith-Doerr, L., 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and the 
locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 116-145. 
Powell, W.W., Packalen, K.A., Whittington, K., 2012. Organizational and institutional genesis: 
The emergence of high-tech clusters in the life sciences, in: Padgett, J., Powell, W.W. 
(Eds.), The emergence of Organizations and Markets. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton & Oxford. 
Powell, W.W., Snellman, K., 2004. The knowledge economy. Annual review of sociology, 
199-220. 
Rathelot, R., Sillard, P., 2008. The Importance of Local Corporate Taxes in Business Location 
Decisions: Evidence from French Micro Data. Economic Journal 118, 499-514. 
Renault, C.S., 2006. Academic capitalism and university incentives for faculty 
entrepreneurship. The Journal of Technology Transfer 31, 227-239. 
Roodman, D., 2009. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in 
Stata. The Stata Journal 9, 86-136. 
Salter, A.J., Martin, B.R., 2001. The economic benefits of publicly funded basic research: a 
critical review. Research Policy 30, 509-532. 
Samila, S., Sorenson, O., 2010. Venture capital as a catalyst to commercialization. Research 
Policy 39, 1348 - 1360. 
Samila, S., Sorenson, O., 2011. Venture capital, entrepreneurship and economic growth. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 93, 338-349. 
Saxenian, A.L., 1991. The origins and dynamics of production networks in Silicon Valley. 
Research Policy 20, 423-437. 
Shane, S., 2009. Why encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is bad public policy. 
Small Business Economics 33, 141-149. 
Shaver, J.M., Flyer, F., 2000. Agglomeration economies, firm heterogeneity, and foreign direct 
investment in the United States. Strategic Management Journal 21, 1175-1193. 
Steffensen, M., Rogers, E.M., 2000. Spin-Offs From Research Centers at a Research 
University. Journal of Business Venturing 15, 93. 
Stephan, P., 2012. How economics shapes science. Harvard University Press. 
Stimson, J.A., 1985. Regression in space and time: A statistical essay. American Journal of 
Political Science, 914-947. 
39 
 
Stuart, T.E., Sorenson, O., 2003a. The geography of opportunity: spatial heterogeneity in 
founding rates and the performance of biotechnology firms. Research Policy 32, 229. 
Stuart, T.E., Sorenson, O., 2003b. Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of 
Entrepreneurial Activity. Administrative Science Quarterly 48, 175-201. 
Tijssen, R.J.W., 2002. Science dependence of technologies: evidence from inventions and their 
inventors. Research Policy 31, 509-526. 
Toole, A.A., 2012. The impact of public basic research on industrial innovation: Evidence 
from the pharmaceutical industry. Research Policy 41, 1-12. 
Van Praag, C.M., Versloot, P.H., 2007. What is the value of entrepreneurship? A review of 
recent research. Small Business Economics 29, 351-382. 
Wennekers, S., Thurik, R., 1999. Linking entrepreneurship and economic growth. Small 
Business Economics 13, 27-56. 
Wessner (ed.), W.C., 2009. An Assessment of the SBIR Program at the National Institutes of 
Health. National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 
Whittington, K.B., Owen-Smith, J., Powell, W.W., 2009. Networks, propinquity, and 
innovation in knowledge-intensive industries. Administrative Science Quarterly 54, 90-
122. 
Wobbekind, R., Lewandowski, B., DiPersio, C., Ford, R., Streit, R., 2012. Economic Impacts 
of the University of Colorado on the State and Counties of Operations. 
Woodward, D., Figueiredo, O., Guimaraes, P., 2006. Beyond the Silicon Valley: University 
R&D and high-technology location. Journal of Urban Economics 60, 15-32. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 1999. Distribution-free estimation of some nonlinear panel data models. 
Journal of Econometrics 90, 77-97. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. The MIT press. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2009. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. South Western 
Cengage Learning. 
Woolley, J.L., Rottner, R.M., 2008. Innovation Policy and Nanotechnology Entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 32, 791-811. 
Zhang, J., 2009. The performance of university spin-offs: an exploratory analysis using venture 
capital data. The Journal of Technology Transfer 34, 255-285. 
Zorn, C., 2006. Comparing GEE and robust standard errors for conditionally dependent data. 
Political Research Quarterly 59, 329-341. 
Zucker, L.G., Darby, M.R., Brewer, M.B., 1998. Intellectual Human Capital and the Birth of 
U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises. American Economic Review 88, 290-306. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1
 Table 2
 Table 3
 Table 4
 Table 5a
 Table 5b
 Table 5c
 Appendix Table
 Figure 1
 Figure 2
 Figure 3
